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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant's appeal is taken from a Judgment on Verdict entered by the trial 
court on December 1, 2004. (Record on Appeal ["R"] at 952-53). Defendant filed a 
Notice of Appeal on December 28, 2004. (R. at 1010-12). The appeal was subsequently 
transferred to this Court from the Utah Supreme Court. As such, this Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether plaintiffs presented any substantial competent evidence during the 
trial of this matter from which a fair and reasonable jury could have concluded that 
plaintiffs suffered $250,000 in damages as a result of Aspen Ridge's breach of contract. 
2. Whether the trial court acted beyond the limits of reasonability when it 
permitted plaintiff Richard Buys to provide an opinion as to the fair market value of Lot 
27, Wolf Creek Ranch, Plat 2A ("Lot 27"), where it was previously established that Mr. 
Buys (a) had been a part owner of Lot 27 since May 10, 2000, (2) was familiar with the 
condition of the Lot 27 at the time of the breach, and (3) had been actively involved with 
the marketing of Lot 27 for over a year. 
3. Whether the trial court properly awarded plaintiffs prejudgment interest 
where the jury was required to calculate its damage award as of a particular date and 
pursuant to a strict mathematical formula. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES 
I. Utah Rule of Evidence 701. Opinion testimony by lay witness. 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' 
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to 
those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on 
the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear 
understanding of the witness9 testimony or the determination 
of a fact in issue. 
III. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37 
* * * 
(f) If a party fails . . . to amend a prior response to discovery 
as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not be permitted 
to use the . . . material at any hearing unless the failure to 
disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the 
failure to disclose. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Plaintiffs commenced this action on March 14, 2003 with the filing of their 
original Complaint. (R. at 13). Prior to service, plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint 
asserting a single cause of action against Aspen Ridge Ranches, L.L.C. ("Aspen Ridge") 
for breach of contract. (R. at 26). The Amended Complaint alleged that Aspen Ridge 
breached a written contract with plaintiffs when it failed to purchase Lot 27 from 
plaintiffs for $750,000.00 on or before July 1, 2002. (Id). In their prayer for relief, 
plaintiffs sought judgment against Aspen Ridge "in the amount of at least $750,000, or 
as otherwise shown at trial" and "[a]ny other relief the Court deems just." (R. at 23.). 
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On October 8, 2003, plaintiffs a filed Second Amended Complaint in 
which they added a claim for trespass against Aspen Ridge, Heber Ranches, L.L.C. and 
unnamed John Doe defendants. (R. at 108). However, plaintiffs prayer for relief still 
sought economic damages in connection with plaintiffs' breach of contract claim against 
Aspen Ridge, as well as general equitable relief. (R. at 103). 
On November 19, 2003, plaintiffs sought leave to file a Third Amended 
Complaint due to the fact that they had been able to identify two of the previously 
unknown John Doe defendants. (R. at 168). In addition, plaintiffs sought to amend their 
prayer for relief to include a specific equitable remedy for Aspen Ridge's breach of 
contract. Specifically, plaintiffs' proposed amendment requested "a decree for specific 
performance that compels Aspen Ridge to purchase Lot 27 for $750,000.00, plus 
statutory interest accrued since July 1, 2001." (R. at 177). 
On December 1, 2003, plaintiffs provided answers to Aspen Ridge's First 
Set of Interrogatories. Interrogatory No. 1 asked plaintiffs to identify "all damages 
which you seek to recover on this action and how you have calculated such damages." 
(R. at 719). In response, plaintiffs answered as follows: 
In connection with their breach of contract claim 
against Aspen Ridge, plaintiffs seek damages in an amount 
equal to Lot 27's option price ($750,000) plus statutory 
interest on the $750,000 between the time the option should 
have been exercised in July 2001 through judgment. As an 
alternative to money damages, plaintiffs seek a decree of 
specific performance that compels Aspen Ridge to purchase 
Lot 27 from plaintiffs for $750,000, plus statutory interest 
-3-
accrued since July 1, 2001. 
(Id). In other words, this interrogatory answer clearly stated that plaintiffs did not 
believe the proper remedy was money damages in amount equal to the difference 
between Lot 27's fair market value and the option price. 
Plaintiffs belief as to the proper measure of damages was further reflected 
in their responses to other interrogatories. For example, Interrogatory No. 3 asked 
plaintiffs to "[s]tate what you contend is the fair market value of Lot 27 as of June 1, 
2001, as of February 2003, and as of any other date that you contend is relevant to your 
damage claim in this action." (R. at 1096, p.28). In response, plaintiffs answered as 
follows: 
Plaintiffs object to Interrogatory No. 3 on the grounds 
that it seeks information that is not relevant to the claims or 
defenses of any party and/or not reasonably calculated to lead 
to the discovery of admissible evidence. Subject to and 
without waiving this objection, plaintiffs answer this 
interrogatory as follows. 
Plaintiffs do not contend that the fair market value of 
Lot 27 is relevant to their damage claim. Therefore, plaintiffs 
not have any contention as to the fair market value of Lot 27 
or any relevant dates. 
(R. at 1096, p.28-29). Aspen Ridge never filed a motion seeking to compel plaintiffs to 
provide a more complete answer to this request. 
On December 3, 2003, the district court scheduled a January 16, 2004 
hearing date for the purpose of hearing "any pending motions," which included the 
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parties' cross-motions for summary judgment and plaintiffs' motion for leave to file their 
Third Amended Complaint. (R. at 494-97). After the hearing, the district court issued a 
Ruling in which it denied both parties' dispositive motions. (R. at 795-99). However, 
none of the parties' remaining motions were addressed in this Ruling. (Id). 
Plaintiffs motion for leave to file a Third Amended Complaint was 
eventually denied on October 22, 2004. (R. at 575). On October 28, 2004, plaintiffs 
again moved the Court for leave to file a Third Amended Complaint. (R. at 577-79). 
However, the proposed pleading was significantly more limited than that which had been 
previously proposed because it did not seek the joinder of additional parties. Instead, it 
simply sought to include a request for specific performance in plaintiffs' prayer for 
relief.1 (Id.). This motion was heard by the Court on November 15, 2004, the first day of 
1
 Technically, plaintiffs were not required to amend their pleading in order to seek 
the remedy of specific performance at trial. In their Second Amended Complaint, 
plaintiffs made a general prayer for "[a]ny other relief the Court deems just." (R. at 103). 
Such language is generally interpreted as being a claim for equitable relief. See, e.g., 
State of Oregon v. Norris, 50 P.3d 595, 599 (Or. App. 2002) (stating that a prayer for 
"other relief as the court deems just and equitable" is a common prayer for equitable 
relief and can form the basis for injunction). Specific performance is considered to be 
one form of equitable relief. See Collardv. Nagle Const, Inc., 2002 UT App. 306, ]f 19, 
57 P.3d 603. Therefore, plaintiffs' proposed amendment was not a new prayer for 
equitable relief, but rather a more definite statement of a previous prayer. 
Furthermore, Utah R.Civ. P. 54(e) states that "every final judgment shall grant the 
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not 
demanded such relief in his pleadings." (emphasis added). In other words, "the prayer 
does not limit the relief, legal, equitable or maritime, which the court may grant." 
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1182 (Utah 1983). As such, 
plaintiffs could have requested a decree of specific performance even in the absence of a 
formal amendment. Nevertheless, plaintiffs decided to move the Court to amend their 
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trial, at which time the Court denied plaintiffs the opportunity to be seek the remedy of 
specific performance. (R. at 1095, p.60). The Court's reasoning for doing so was as 
follows: 
It's the court's opinion that, Mr. Stirba, your clients 
got an adequate remedy with respect to monetary damages. 
They're gonna get the benefit of their bargain. They're 
gonna get - If this jury determines that there was a breach 
they're going to be awarded $750,000 in damages. Whether 
it be in - It's going to be the difference between the value of 
the land and what they've contracted for. And the court finds 
that to be an adequate remedy. 
If you claim that this lot does not have, you know, 
because it's unsalable, then its value will be substantially less 
than $750,000. I don't know what you've offered it for or 
what the listing is for it. But for that, the jury will make a 
determination as to what that value is. And if there's a 
difference between the value and $750,000 plus interest, then 
you'll get, your clients will get the monetary difference 
between that and the value of the lot. 
(R. at 1095, p.60). 
Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim against Aspen Ridge was tried to a jury 
beginning November 15, 2004. At the trial's conclusion, the jury was instructed, in part, 
as follows: 
Instruction No. 32 
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Aspen 
Ridge breached the option agreement, then plaintiffs would 
be entitled to recover as damages the difference between the 
pleading in order to add a claim for specific performance so that the scope of relief 
available to plaintiffs could be determined prior to trial. 
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fair market value of the land as of July 1,2001 and the 
purchase price in the option agreement, ($750,000). 
Instruction No. 33 
The fair-market value of the land is defined as the price at 
which a fully informed, willing owner would have voluntarily 
sold and a fully informed, willing buyer would have 
voluntarily bought the land in question. 
(R. at 862-63). 
The jury ultimately rendered a verdict in which it determined that Aspen 
Ridge had breached the relevant contract and that plaintiffs had suffered damages in the 
amount of $250,000. (R. at 897-98). On December 1, 2004, the district court entered 
judgment on the jury's verdict and awarded plaintiffs pre-judgment interest at ten percent 
per annum. (R. at 951-53). 
II. RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Background 
On May 10, 2000, plaintiffs entered into two written agreements with 
defendant, Aspen Ridge. First, plaintiffs agreed to transfer 240 acres of undeveloped 
land to Aspen Ridge in exchange for a previously developed lot located in the Wolf 
Creek Ranches subdivision, Lot 27. Second, the parties signed a written contract, 
entitled "Option Agreement," in which Aspen Ridge purchased a three-year option to 
obtain Lot 27 from plaintiffs for the price of $750,000. (R. at 877). 
The Option Agreement contained a paragraph no. 6 entitled "Events 
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Which Shall Obligate Buyer to Exercise the Option." This paragraph stated as follows: 
Events Which Shall Obligate Buyer to Exercise the Option. 
Seller [plaintiffs] and Buyer [Aspen Ridge] acknowledge that 
as of the date of this Agreement, Buyer is the Owner of Lot 
46 and Lot 47 in Wolf Creek Ranch. If at any time 
throughout the term of this Agreement, Buyer sells either 
Lot 46 or Lot 47, Buyer shall be obligated to exercise the 
Option with respect to the purchase of the Property [Lot 27] 
within thirty (30) days following the closing on the sale of 
either of Lot 46 or Lot 47. Throughout the term of this 
Agreement, Buyer shall have the right to solicit offers for the 
sale of the Property by Buyer. In the event that Buyer 
receives an offer with respect to the sale of the Property 
which Buyer desires to accept, then Buyer shall immediately 
thereafter exercise the Option with respect to the purchase by 
Buyer of the Property from Seller. 
(Id..) (emphasis added). 
At trial, it was undisputed that Aspen Ridge sold the aforementioned Lot 
46 on June 1, 2001. (R. at 1096, p.196-97, 214, 22). It was further undisputed that 
Aspen Ridge had never purchased Lot 27 from plaintiffs. (Id..). As such, Plaintiffs 
argued that Aspen Ridge breached paragraph six of the Option Agreement when it failed 
to purchase Lot 27 from plaintiffs for $750,000 within thirty days after its sale of Lot 46. 
The jury agreed and entered a verdict which found Aspen Ridge to be in breach of 
contract. (R. at 897-98). The jury's finding with respect to this issue is not being 
challenged on appeal. 
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B. Evidence of Lot 27's Fair Market Value2 
1. Richard Buys 
At the time of trial, Mr. Buys had been a resident of Wasatch County for 
over thirty years. (R. at 1095, p. 178). Prior to May 2000, Mr. Buys had been on the land 
which now comprises Lot 27 when he and the other plaintiffs had hunted on the 
property. (R. at 1096, p. 239). Eventually, in May 2000, Mr. Buys obtained an 
ownership interest in Lot 27. (R. at 1096, p. 14). 
On direct examination, Mr. Buys was asked whether he had an opinion as 
to the fair market value of Lot 27 in July 2001, to which he replied "yes." (Id. at p. 15). 
However, pursuant to an objection and before allowing Mr. Buys to provide his opinion, 
the district court required Mr. Buys to provide some foundation testimony, outside the 
presence of the jury, regarding the basis for his opinion. (Id. at 18). This foundation 
testimony was as follows: 
Q. Mr. Buys, you now have an opinion as to the fair 
market value of Lot 27? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. And your deposition was taken in October of '03; is 
that right? 
2
 Aspen Ridge is claiming there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's 
verdict with respect to damages. As such, the facts set forth herein will reflect only the 
evidence upon which the jury could have relied as a basis for its determination that 
plaintiffs suffered $250,000 in damages. See Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378, % 16, 
102 P.3d 774 (To support an insufficiency of the evidence claim on appeal, the one 
challenging the verdict must demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in 
the light most favorable to the verdict.) 
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A. That's correct. 
Q. And since October of '03 tell the Court what 
information you have, that you have received or come to 
learn that provides you a basis now to render an opinion as an 
owner of the property as to the market value? [3] 
A. My basis is determined by the fact that we have been 
attempting to market this piece of property now for over a 
year. We have been unsuccessful to market it at rates set by 
Mr. Anderson [the owner of Aspen Ridge]. And we have 
had only one valid offer during the course of this time. And 
that was for $500,000. 
* * * 
Q. So you - And when did you list the property, Mr. 
Buys? 
A. It's been a little over a year ago. 
Q. And at the time of your deposition had it been listed 
for very long? 
A. A very short time. 
Q. Have you also had occasion to read a deposition from 
Mr. Anderson? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. And was that available to you back when your 
deposition was taken? 
A. No, it was not. 
Q. And how does that influence your opinion as to the 
fair market value of the land in July of '01? 
A. That influences my feeling that the value of the land 
was diminished by the deposition of Mr. Anderson. 
Q. And can you explain to the Court why, what, what, 
what is there in the deposition that leads you to that 
conclusion? 
A. Mr. Anderson was unable to sell the property over a 
period of time that it was under contract for three years. It 
did not sell at market value.[4] And based on that the 
3
 Mr. Buys had previously testified in his October 2003 deposition that he did not 
have an opinion as to Lot 27's fair market value. 
4
 Under the Option Agreement, Aspen Ridge had the right to solicit offers during 
the option term. See Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 55 at f^ 6. 
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property did not go up in value but other than what I 
stipulated. 
Q. Do you recall also in his deposition that he testified 
about the use of that particular lot since 1999? 
A. Yes, that piece of property has been used by Mr. 
Anderson, which diminished its value, as a staging area for 
his construction project. With it used as a construction 
staging area this piece of property would be extremely 
difficult to sell. 
Q. And was the, was the description that Mr. Anderson 
gave in his deposition, which you've now had the occasion to 
read, consistent with what you observed in 2003? 
A. Yes, that it was a staging area and that he had done 
excavation on the property. 
Q. Okay, is there anything else that you have since 
learned that you want to tell the Court in terms of why now 
you have an opinion on the value of the land, and you did not 
have an opinion back when your deposition was taken on 
October of '03? 
A. My basis is very simple, that we have attempted to sell 
the property. The property has not been - We've not been 
able to sell it even at a reduced rate. And therefore, the 
property has lesser value. 
(R.atl096,p.21-24). 
Based on this testimony, the Court determined that Mr. Buys was 
competent to provide an opinion as to the fair market value of Lot 27. Mr. Buys 
proceeded to testify that it was his opinion that Lot 27 had a fair market value of 
$500,000 as of July 2001. {Id. at p. 30). 
2. Douglas Anderson 
On direct examination, Mr. Anderson, a part-owner of Aspen Ridge, 
testified that on May 10, 2000, he met with plaintiffs in order to sign the Option 
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Agreement. During this meeting, Mr. Anderson stated that Aspen Ridge would continue 
to market Lot 27 to the public and that if it was able to find a buyer, Aspen Ridge would 
purchase the Lot, sell it to the buyer, and keep the difference between the purchase price 
and the option price. (R. at 1096, p.193-95). 
Mr. Anderson continued to testify on direct examination that after the 
option was signed, there was a "big change" in the number of sales occurring in the Wolf 
Creek Subdivision. (R. at 1096, p. 196). Specifically, he stated that "the number of sales 
went down" during the remainder of 2000, partially due to the drop in the stock market. 
(Id). He went on to testify that while the average price of lots remained stable, "several 
of the lots dropped." (Id.). 
On cross-examination, Mr. Anderson admitted that Aspen Ridge had used 
Lot 27 as a "staging area" since 1999. (R. at 1096, p.236) (Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 
72.B.1). He further admitted that the lot continuously had a large dirt berm piled on it 
between 1999 and September 2003. (R. at 1096, p.237) (Plaintiffs Exhibit Nos. 72.B.2 
and 72.B.3).5 
Finally, it was undisputed that Aspen Ridge had been unable to sell Lot 27 
between May 2000 and July 2003, at which time plaintiffs transferred the listing of Lot 
27 to another real estate agent. (R. at 1096, p.78). 
5
 Plaintiffs urge the Court to view the cited exhibits, as they are photographs 
which accurately depict the effect the staging area and berm had on Lot 27's aesthetics. 
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3. Douglas Tulloch 
Mr. Tulloch is the real estate agent who obtained the listing for Lot 27 in 
June 2003. (R. at 1096, p.78). He was called as a witness by Aspen Ridge. On direct 
examination, he testified as follows: 
Q. And you'll tell the jury that market value is a different 
question then [sic] whether the market is slow? 
A. Market value and whether the market are slow to me -
Well, I think they're tied together. But market value is 
always what somebody is willing to sell for and what 
someone is willing to pay. That is the only determining 
factor in market value. 
Q. And you could have a high sell in a slow market? 
A. It would be an anomaly. 
(Id. at p. 83). Mr. Tulloch further testified on direct examination that he had listed Lot 
27 for as low as $799,000. (Id. at p. 88). 
On cross-examination, Mr. Tulloch admitted that he had not been able to 
sell Lot 27 between June 2003 and November 2004. (R. at 1096, p.93-94). Mr. Tulloch 
further testified that the Aspen Ridge's own real estate agent made the representation that 
Lot 27 was "a crappy lot" and that it still needed a $200,000 driveway. (Id. at p.94)6 Mr. 
Tulloch then explained why there had been problems with selling Lot 27: 
6
 In its opening brief, Aspen Ridge states that the Court should disregard this 
representation because it is hearsay. However, the record reflects that no objection was 
made to this testimony at trial. (R. at 1096, p.94). Therefore, it is deemed admitted for 
purposes of this appeal. See State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Utah 1986) 
(stating in order "[t]o preserve a contention of error in the admission of evidence for 
appeal, a defendant must raise a timely objection in the trial court."). 
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Q. And you know that the condition of Lot 27 poses some 
real problems for you trying to sell; isn't that true? 
A. Condition in two ways. One, it is not very desirable 
lot if you want a tree. Two, the condition when I took the 
listing, unknown to me, I drove there and found major 
disturbances on the lot. 
* * * 
Q. All right. Let me ask you this Mr. Tulloch, what 
you're saying is you take clients up there; is that right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you go on the roadway that went right past lot 27; 
true? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you look at lot 27 and you'd observe a 
disturbance right in the front; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Essentially there would be a debris field; correct? 
A. Very much so. 
Q. And there would be concrete and rocks in there; 
correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And there was a large berm there; correct? 
A. Extremely large. 
sjc * * 
Q. In other words, if you take those clients on that 
roadway they see the same thing you would see, the condition 
of the front of the lot, wouldn't they? 
A. Yes, they would. 
* * * 
Q. Now, you also saw other lots, did you not, in Wolf 
Creek as you'd show people lot 27? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Certainly didn't observe the condition of those lots in 
the same condition as lot 27, did you? 
A. Lot 27 was unique in that respect. 
Q. In other words, one of the worse looking lots up there, 
isn't it. 
A. It looked very bad then. 
{Id. atp.95-98). 
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Finally, Mr. Tulloch confirmed that he received three offers for Lot 27 
after listing it for $799,000 and none of these offers lead to sales. (R. at 1096, p.99-100). 
Furthermore, he explained that two of the three offers were made after the berm and 
debris field which existed in July 2001 had been removed. (R. at 116-117). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
On appeal, Aspen Ridge claims that plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient 
evidence to support the jury's $250,000 damage award. In doing so, Aspen Ridge claims 
the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed plaintiff Richard Buys to provide an 
opinion as to Lot 27's fair market value as of July 2001. Specifically, Aspen Ridge 
argues that (a) Mr. Buys was not competent to provide this opinion, and (b) the opinion 
should have been excluded because it was not previously disclosed in discovery. 
Aspen Ridge's arguments are without merit. First, Mr. Buys was 
competent to provide an opinion as to Lot 27's fair market value because he was an 
owner of the property and was sufficiently familiar with its characteristics and value. 
Second, Mr. Buys' decision not to supplement his previous discovery response regarding 
Lot 27's fair market did not justify the exclusion of his testimony. This is because, prior 
to trial, plaintiffs were seeking specific performance as relief and Lot 27's fair market 
value was irrelevant to this claim. Furthermore, the trial court's decision to admit Mr. 
Buys' opinion was harmless because Aspen Ridge was fully prepared to rebut his 
opinion via expert testimony and cross-examination. 
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Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that this Court is inclined to exclude Mr. 
Buys' opinion, it should still refrain from vacating the jury's damage award. This is 
because there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict, even in the absence of 
Mr. Buys' testimony. 
Finally, Aspen Ridge is appealing the trial court's award of pre-judgment 
interest. However, Utah courts have consistently held that fair market valuations of real 
property are within the category of damages upon which prejudgment interest may be 
awarded. Therefore, since the jury was required to base its damage award on the fair 
market value of Lot 27 as of a particular date, the trial court's award should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE JURY'S DAMAGE AWARD. 
A. Standard of Review 
"The function of a jury is to act as reasonable persons in discerning the true 
state of the facts where factual disputes exist, to discern the credibility of witnesses, and 
to apply the law to the facts as instructed by the trial court in reaching a verdict." Reeves 
v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111,114 (Utah 1991). A such, appellate courts "do not substitute 
[their] judgment for the jury's verdict when it is supported by substantial evidence." 
State v. Collier, 736 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah 1987). 
Based on the foregoing rationale, Utah courts have held that "to support an 
insufficiency of the evidence claim on appeal, the one challenging the verdict must 
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marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is 
insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." Hatch, 2004 UT 
App 378 at |^ 16 (internal quotation marks omitted). "So long as some evidence and 
reasonable inferences support the jury's findings, [appellate courts] will not disturb 
them." Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433 (Utah 1998). 
Finally, "[ o]nce a defendant has been shown to have caused a loss, . . . the 
reasonable level of certainty required to establish the amount of a loss is generally lower 
than that required to establish the fact or cause of a loss." CookAssocs., Inc. v. Warnick, 
664 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted) (emphasis in the original). As such, 
"[t]he amount of damages may be based upon approximations, if the fact of damage is 
established, and the approximations are based upon reasonable assumptions or 
projections." Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel & Tel Co., 709 P.2d 330, 336 
(Utah 1985). "As long as there is some rational basis for a damage award, it is the 
wrongdoer who must assume the risk of some uncertainty. Where there is evidence of 
the fact of damage, a defendant may not escape liability because the amount of damage 
cannot be proved with precision." Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 956 (Utah 1983). 
In this case, Aspen Ridge essentially concedes that if the admission of Mr. 
Buys' testimony regarding the fair market value of Lot 27 is upheld, the jury's verdict as 
to damages must stand. Plaintiffs contend that the admission of this testimony was 
proper and therefore this Court should affirm the verdict on this ground alone. However, 
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even if this Court is inclined to exclude Mr. Buys' testimony, the jury's verdict must still 
be upheld because there is other competent evidence in the record which supports the 
jury's damage award. 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Allowing the 
Admission of Mr. Buys' Testimony. 
1. Mr. Buys was competent to provide a lay opinion as to Lot 27's 
fair market value. 
Aspen Ridge claims that the district court erred when it allowed Mr. Buys 
to provide an opinion as to the value of Lot 27 at the time Aspen Ridge breached the 
Option Agreement. The trial court's decision to allow such testimony was governed by 
Utah Rule of Evidence 701, which states that any witness may provide testimony in the 
form of an opinion, so long as the testimony is "(a) rationally based on the perception of 
the witness and (b) helpful to . . . the determination of a fact in issue." 
With respect to the first requirement, Utah's appellate courts "generally 
accord deference to a trial court's determination of whether an adequate foundation for 
admission of evidence Ms laid and sufficient showing of credibility of the evidence is 
established. The ruling of the trial court in this regard will not be overturned unless there 
is a showing of an abuse of discretion.'" Procon Corporation v. Utah Dept. of 
Transportation, 876 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah App. 1994). "An abuse of discretion occurs 
only when the trial court's ruling is 'beyond the limits of reasonability." 
In this case, the trial court did not exceed the bounds of reasonableness 
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when it determined that Mr. Buys was competent to provide an opinion as to Lot 27's 
fair market value because the opinion was "rationally based on the perception" of Mr. 
Buys as a part owner of Lot 27. See Utah R.Evid. 701 In fact, "[i]t has long been held by 
[the Utah Supreme] Court that an owner of real property who is familiar with his 
property is competent to give evidence on the market value of that property'' Utah 
Dept of Transportation v. Jones, 694 P.2d 1031, 1036 (Utah 1984) (emphasis added). 
It must be emphasized that while Utah courts have generally stated an 
owner must be "familiar" with his property in order to opine as to its value, they have 
never placed an bright-line threshold on the amount of familiarity that an owner must 
possess. To the contrary, the Supreme Court recognized long ago that "[t]he limited 
experiences of the witnesses might tend to depreciate the weight of their testimony, but it 
would not make them incompetent to testify if they were acquainted with land values." 
Provo River Water Users Ass'n v. Carlson, 133 P.2d 777, 782 (Utah 1943); see also 
Vreeman v. Davis, 348 N.W.2d 756, 757 (Minn. 1984) ("An owner is competent to 
express an opinion on the market value of his or her property, and ordinarily any 
weakness in the foundation for that opinion goes to its weight, not its admissibility."); 
Kleinschmidt v. Morrow, 642 A.2d 161, 164 (Me. 1994) (Any objection raised as to 
owner's "actual familiarity with the particular property 'goes to the weight of the 
evidence, not to its admissibility'...."). In other words, a witness is permitted to provide 
testimony as to the value of their property as long as they have some degree of familiarity 
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with the land. 
In this case, plaintiffs did present sufficient evidence to show that Mr. 
Buys, a part owner of Lot 27, was familiar with Lot 27 at the time he testified as to its 
value. For example, Mr. Buys had been on Lot 27 prior to purchasing it when he and the 
other plaintiffs hunted on the land. (R. at 1096, p. 239). Mr. Buys was aware that in July 
2001 the Lot had been used as a staging area by Aspen Ridge's construction crews, that 
there were enormous piles of dirt located on the property and that the property looked 
substantially the same as it had when he visited the land in the summer of 2003. (R. at 
1096, p.21-24). In other words, Mr. Buys knew where the land was located, he was 
familiar with its general topography and he knew that there were several aesthetic defects 
on the land that could impact a buyer's willingness to purchase the land. 
Most importantly, Mr. Buys had been involved in the marketing of Lot 27 
to the public for over a year prior to testifying at trial. During that entire time, Mr. Buys 
states that he and the other plaintiffs received only one valid offer for Lot 27 in the 
amount of $500,000. Mr. Buys also knew that Aspen Ridge had been marketing Lot 27 
from June 2000 through July 2003 at prices higher than $500,000 and that it had been 
unable to find a buyer for the property during that time. (Id). Therefore, given the fact 
that the location and condition of Lot 27 had not changed between July 2001 and the 
time Mr. Buys' testified, there was a rational basis for Mr. Buys to conclude that Lot 27's 
fair market value was no greater than $500,000. See Atkin Wright & Miles, 709 P.2d at 
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336 ("[t]he amount of [plaintiff s] damages may be based upon approximations, if the 
fact of damage is established, and the approximations are based upon reasonable 
assumptions or projections."). 
It must be emphasized that Aspen Ridge does not argue that Mr. Buys has 
no familiarity with Lot 27. Instead, it attacks the strength of his familiarity through 
argument. For example, Aspen Ridge does not dispute that Mr. Buys has an ownership 
interest in Lot 27, but rather argues his ownership percentage is too small. Likewise, 
Aspen Ridge does not dispute that Mr. Buys has been to Lot 27 or that he is familiar with 
how it would have appeared in July 2001. Rather, it argues that he has not visited the 
property enough times to form a competent opinion. Finally, Aspen Ridge does not 
dispute that it was unable to sell Lot 27 between May 2000 and June 2003 or that the 
plaintiffs received only a single $500,000 offer for the property when they had it listed 
for sale. Rather, it argues that this time span was not long enough to reflect Lot 27's true 
market value. 
The fact is that all of Aspen Ridge's arguments go to perceived weaknesses 
in the basis for Mr. Buys' opinion. However, such arguments go the weight the jury 
should afford Mr. Buys' testimony, not his competency to testify. See Provo River Water 
Users Ass % 133 P.2d at 782 ("[t]he limited experiences of the witnesses might tend to 
depreciate the weight of their testimony, but it would not make them incompetent to 
testify if they were acquainted with land values."). In fact, Aspen Ridge was afforded a 
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full opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Buys' credibility with respect to all of the 
foregoing arguments. Moreover, Aspen Ridge presented testimony from an expert 
appraiser who gave a contrary opinion as to Lot 27's fair market value. As such, the jury 
was fully aware of all the inherent weaknesses in Mr. Buys' opinion. See Edward L. 
Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, Utah Evidence Law, 7-2 (1996) ("[E]ven if lay opinion is 
erroneously admitted, it should rarely require dismissal, since the weakness of lay 
opinion, especially when expertise is called for, should be easily demonstrated by cross-
examination and argument."). Despite these supposed weaknesses, the jury unanimously 
entered a damage award that was consistent with Mr. Buys' testimony. This Court 
should respect the jury's determination and allow the damage award to stand. 
Finally, plaintiffs rely primarily on two Utah Supreme Court cases as 
support for their argument, Utah State Road Comm 'n v. The Steele Ranch, 533 P.2d 888 
(Utah 1975) and Utah State Road Comm 'n v. Johnson, 550 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976). 
However, these decisions are easily distinguishable from the present case. For example, 
in Steele Ranch, the Supreme Court did recognize that an property owner may not opine 
as to the value of his property where he does "not have any realistic idea of its value" by 
virtue of the manner in which he obtained the land. 533 P.2d at 891 (emphasis added). 
However, the court never stated that an owner who is familiar with his property's 
location and topography, and who has been actively marketing his property for over a 
year, falls within this category of owners. In fact, the jury's verdict was only overturned 
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after the Supreme Court determined that the jury had been instructed to appraise 
severance damages on a larger parcel of property than what was legally at issue in the 
case. Id.. Finally, the Supreme Court emphasized that appellate courts should be 
cautious in determining whether a jury's calculation of damages is supported by 
sufficient evidence: 
[W]e recognize that neither the trial court, nor this reviewing 
court, should trespass upon the prerogative of the jury by 
applying a subjective measure of our own ideas of 
'reasonableness' and rejecting as not 'substantial' any 
evidence which fails to meet that test. Allowance should be 
made for the fact that there is a comparatively wide orbit 
through which reasonable minds may swing; and that what 
may be considered reasonable in the broad sense need not 
necessarily fit into the exact pattern of our own thought. 
533 P.2d at 890. 
In Johnson, the Supreme Court was faced with the discrete question of 
whether a property owner's opinion regarding the value of his property could be based 
solely on what the property was worth to him. Specifically, the basis the owner gave for 
his opinion was "Well, it is my life's work and it provided me a good living . . . I know 
what it is worth to me." 550 P.2d at 217. The Supreme Court determined that "[w]hat 
the property is worth to a seller is not a correct basis for an opinion, and the motion to 
strike the answer should have been granted." Id.. In this case, Mr. Buys did not base his 
opinion on what Lot 27 was worth to him. To the contrary, it was based on what the 
property was apparently worth to third-party prospective buyers over a period of four 
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years. As such, the holding in Johnson has no application to the facts of this case. 
In sum, Mr. Buys provided sufficient testimony which showed that his 
opinion as to Lot 27 's fair market value was "rationally based" on his perceptions of the 
property's worth. See Utah R.Evid. 701. He was familiar with the property's location 
and topography and was aware of the efforts which had been made to sell the property 
over the previous four years, including the listing prices and offers to buy. While 
plaintiffs did challenge the credibility of Mr. Buys' opinion, all such arguments go the 
weight of Mr. Buys testimony and not its admissibility, especially where Aspen Ridge 
was permitted to fully-cross examine Mr. Buys as to his opinion. As such, this Court 
should affirm the trial court's admission of Mr. Buys' opinion and, in turn, affirm the 
jury's damage award. 
2. The trial court properly declined to exclude Mr, Buys' opinion 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37. 
Aspen Ridge argues that Mr. Buys should not have been permitted to 
provide an opinion as to Lot 27's fair market value because he allegedly failed to 
supplement his response to Aspen Ridge's Interrogatory No. 3. However, under the 
unique circumstances of this case, there was good cause for the court to excuse a 
supplementation, assuming plaintiffs were even under such a duty. Furthermore, the 
introduction of Mr. Buys' testimony was harmless because Aspen Ridge was fully 
prepared to rebut his testimony. See Utah R.Civ. P. 37(f) (a party shall not be permitted 
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to introduce that should have been disclosed pursuant to a previous discovery request 
"unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure to 
disclose."). 
As an initial matter, plaintiffs' answer to Interrogatory No. 3 must be 
placed in the proper context. On November 19, 2003, plaintiffs sought leave to file their 
Third Amended Complaint in order to include a particular prayer for specific 
performance. Soon thereafter, on December 1, 2003, plaintiffs provided their answers to 
Aspen Ridge's first set of discovery requests. Therein, plaintiffs were first asked to 
identify "all damages which you seek to recover on this action." In response, plaintiffs 
expressly stated that they were seeking "a decree of specific performance" that compelled 
Aspen Ridge to purchase Lot 27 for the option price, plus interest. Plaintiffs were then 
asked in Interrogatory No. 3 to "[sjtate what you contend is the fair market value of Lot 
27 as of June 1, 2001, as of February 2003, and as of any other date that you contend is 
relevant to your damage claim in this action." (R. at 1096, p.28). In response, plaintiffs 
answered as follows: 
Plaintiffs object to Interrogatory No. 3 on the grounds 
that it seeks information that is not relevant to the claims or 
defenses of any party and/or not reasonably calculated to lead 
to the discovery of admissible evidence. Subject to and 
without waiving this objection, plaintiffs answer this 
interrogatory as follows. 
Plaintiffs do not contend that the fair market value of 
Lot 27 is relevant to their damage claim. Therefore, plaintiffs 
not have any contention as to the fair market value of Lot 27 
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or any relevant dates. 
(R. at 1096, p.28-29). In other words, plaintiffs' answer clearly reflected the fact that 
they did not believe Lot 27's fair market value was relevant because they were seeking 
specific performance as remedy. 
It was not until the first day of trial, approximately one year after plaintiffs 
provided the foregoing discovery responses, that the trial court denied plaintiffs' prayer 
for specific performance. In other words, prior to trial, plaintiffs believed that the fair 
market value of Lot 27 was wholly irrelevant. It was on this basis that the trial court 
determined that there was "good cause" for plaintiffs' decision not to supplement their 
response to Interrogatory No. 3 prior to trial. (R. at 1096, p.29). 
In addition, Aspen Ridge did not suffer any harm as a result of plaintiffs' 
decision not to supplement their discovery response because it was fully prepared to 
rebut Mr. Buys' testimony regarding fair market value. In fact, Aspen Ridge presented 
the testimony of an appraiser who was qualified as an expert witness in the area of 
property valuations. (R. at 1096, p. 117-48). Aspen Ridge was also prepared to attack 
the perceived weaknesses in Mr. Buys' opinion, as evidenced by its vigorous cross-
examination of him. (Id. at p. 24-37; 41-43). In fact, the record indicates that Aspen 
Ridge fully expected Mr. Buys to provide an opinion as to Lot 27's value because within 
moments after he was asked to provide his opinion, defense counsel immediately 
produced Mr. Buys' deposition transcript to point out a perceived inconsistency in his 
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previous testimony. {Id. at p. 15). Therefore, Aspen Ridge did not suffer any real 
prejudice as a result of Mr. Buys' testimony. 
"Trial courts have 'broad discretion in selecting and imposing sanctions for 
discovery violations....'" Tuck v. Godfrey, 1999 UT App 127,^ j 15, 981 P.2d 407 
(quoting Preston & Chambers, P.C v. Roller, 943 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah App. 1997)). As 
such, a trial court's decision whether or not to impose discovery sanctions will not be 
disturbed unless its decision is "beyond the limits of reasonability." Procon 
Corporation, 876 P.2d at 893. In this case, it was entirely reasonable for the trial court 
to refrain from excluding Mr. Buys' opinion where plaintiffs did not believe the opinion 
would be relevant until the commencement of trial. Therefore, in light of the fact that 
Aspen Ridge was fully prepared to rebut Mr. Buys' testimony, this Court should uphold 
the trial court's ruling and affirm the jury's verdict with respect to damages. 
C. Even if Mr. Buys5 Testimony is Excluded, Plaintiffs Still Provided 
Sufficient Evidence to Support the Jury's Damage Award. 
Even if this Court is inclined to believe that the trial court abused its 
discretion by allowing Mr. Buys to provide an opinion as to Lot 27's value, it should still 
affirm the jury's damage award. This is because there was other evidence in the record 
upon which the jury could have based its determination. See Child, 972 P.2d at 433 ("So 
long as some evidence and reasonable inferences support the jury's findings, [appellate 
courts] will not disturb them."). 
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At trial, the parties introduced a significant amount of evidence from which 
the jury could infer that the value of Lot 27 dropped significantly after Aspen Ridge 
initially obtained its $750,000 option in May 2000. For example, Mr. Anderson testified 
that after Aspen Ridge purchased the option, there was a "big change" in the number of 
sales occurring in the Wolf Creek Subdivision and that "number of sales went down" 
during the reminder of 2000 due to a drop in the stock market. (R. at 1096, p. 196). 
Moreover, it was undisputed that Aspen Ridge had been unable to sell Lot 27 between 
May 2000 and July 2003. (Id. at p.78). A jury could certainly equate a lack of potential 
buyers for Lot 27 with a drop in its fair market value. In fact, Aspen Ridge's own 
witness confirmed that there was direct correlation between a slow market and market 
value when he testified on direct examination that the two concepts are "tied together." 
(Matp.83). 
In addition to the existence of a slow market, the jury heard evidence which 
suggested that Lot 27 was one of the least desirable parcels in the Wolf Creek 
Subdivision. For example, it had few trees and there was a field of debris on the front 
portion of the lot due to Aspen Ridge's use of the property as a staging area for 
construction. There was also a huge berm of dirt located near the road. Finally, the lot 
was in need of a $200,000 driveway. All of this lead Mr. Tulloch to agree that Lot 27 
was "one of the worse looking lots" in the Wolf Creek subdivision. In fact, Aspen 
Ridge's own real estate agent described Lot 27 as "a crappy lot." (R. at 1096, p.94-98). 
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Finally, there was the evidence that plaintiffs had been unable to sell Lot 27 
between June 2003 and July 2004, even when they listed the price as low as $799,000. 
In fact, Mr. Tulloch testified that even the offers plaintiffs received after the debris and 
berm had been removed from Lot 27 were not high enough to lead to a sale. 
The jury was instructed that the fair-market value of land is equal to "the 
price at which a fully informed, willing owner would have voluntarily sold and a fully 
informed, willing buyer would have voluntarily bought the land in question." (R. at 862-
63). Based on this definition, a jury could infer from the relevant offers that Lot 27 was 
worth significantly less than $799,000 after all of the dirt and debris was removed, as this 
was the lowest price at which the lot was listed. However, such dirt and debris had not 
been removed as of July 2001, thus justifying a further reduction in fair market value. 
Furthermore, the lot needed $200,000 in improvements over and above the purchase 
price. When all of these factors are coupled with a slow real estate market and the fact 
that Lot 27 was one of the worst looking lots in the subdivision, it would not be 
unreasonable for a jury to conclude that Lot 27's approximate value was $500,000 in 
July 2001. See Bastian, 661 P.2d at 956 (Damage award will be upheld "[a]s long as 
there is some rational basis" for the award."). 
In conclusion, plaintiffs request this Court to uphold the trial court's 
decision to admit Mr. Buys' opinion regarding Lot 27's fair market value and, in turn, 
affirm the jury's damage award on the basis of his testimony. However, even if this 
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Court is inclined to exclude Mr. Buys' testimony, there is still sufficient evidence in the 
record to support the jury's verdict. Therefore, this Court should refrain from disturbing 
the jury's damage award on the grounds of insufficient evidence. 
II. PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT INTEREST. 
"As established nearly a century ago in Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 
Utah courts award prejudgment interest in cases where 'damages are complete' and can 
be measured by 'fixed rules of evidence and known standards of value.'" Smith v. 
Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, \ 17, 82 P.3d 1064, 1068 (citing Fell, 88 P. 1003, 1007 
(1907)). 
Based on the Fell decision, Utah courts have held that "fair market 
valuations of real property are within the category of damages upon which prejudgment 
interest may be properly awarded." Id. at \ 21. "The fact that the parties disputed the 
value of the property at trial does not change our conclusion that the jury's determination 
of the property's value was 'ascertained in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and 
known standards of value'" Id. at f^ 23 (internal marks omitted) (emphasis added). 
In this case the award of damages was calculated by the jury according to 
the terms of the contract at issue. The disputed land's contract price was $750,000 and 
plaintiffs presented evidence that the fair market value of the land on July 1, 2001 was 
$500,000. The jury then determined, pursuant to a mathematical formula presented to 
them in a jury instruction, that the plaintiffs should be awarded damages in the amount of 
-30-
$250,000. Obviously, the jury took the contract price and subtracted the fair market 
value of the land to arrive at this figure. Thus, Plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment 
interest. See Smith, 2003 UT 41 f 23. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, plaintiffs respectfully request this Court to affirm 
both the jury's $250,000 damage award and the trial court's award of prejudgment 
interest. 
DATED this J_2_\lay of August, 2005. 
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